@article {Coleman9, author = {Thomas S. Coleman and Laurence B. Siegel}, title = {Compensating Fund Managers for Risk{\textendash}Adjusted Performance}, volume = {2}, number = {3}, pages = {9--15}, year = {1999}, doi = {10.3905/jai.1999.318908}, publisher = {Institutional Investor Journals Umbrella}, abstract = {A risk-adjusted performance fee structure which addresses incentive compatibility and helps reduce asymmetry, while at the same time being feasible and easy to implement would be a practical performance fee structure that principally compensates the manager for risk-adjusted performance by adjusting for the volatility of returns. For a fund manager this can provide a credible way to offer a volatility target as well as a return target, since the manager{\textquoteright}s compensation is contingent on realized volatility. For risk-averse investors this opens up the opportunity to choose managers based on the manager{\textquoteright}s incentives to meet risk as well as return objectives.}, issn = {1520-3255}, URL = {https://jai.pm-research.com/content/2/3/9}, eprint = {https://jai.pm-research.com/content/2/3/9.full.pdf}, journal = {The Journal of Alternative Investments} }